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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND THE FUTURE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
MARK L. MOVSESIAN*

INTRODUCTION
Last term, the Supreme Court decided Masterpiece Cakeshop,
one of several recent cases in which religious believers have
sought to avoid the application of public accommodations laws
that ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.1 Like
most such disputes, the case involved a small business that
declined, because of the owner’s religious convictions, to
provide a service for a same-sex wedding—in this case,
Colorado cake designer Jack Phillips’s convictions against
designing and baking a cake for a gay couple, Charlie Craig
and Dave Mullins.2 In most of these cases, courts have been
unwilling to exempt businesses from the anti-discrimination
laws on religious grounds and have ruled in favor of the
customers. One might have thought Jack Phillips would lose in
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John’s. I thank Marc DeGirolami, John McGinnis, Micah Schwartzman, and
Michael Simons, as well as the participants in a conference on “Religion and the
State” at the Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason
University, and a conference on “Higher Powers” at the Notre Dame Center for
Ethics and Culture, for thoughtful comments. I wrote much of this paper while a
Visiting Fellow at Princeton University’s James Madison Program in American
Ideals and Institutions, and presented it there as part of the Program’s workshop
series. I thank the Madison Program for its support and the participants at that
workshop for their helpful feedback.
1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018). For other recent cases, see, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F.
Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53
(N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389
P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v.
City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop as well. Indeed, many observers were
surprised that the Court had granted cert in his case at all.3
Somewhat surprisingly, though, the Supreme Court ruled in
his favor, on the basis of an argument few observers had
credited before the Court heard the case.4 In a 7-2 opinion by
Justice Kennedy, the Court held that, in deciding that Phillips’s
refusal to create a cake for a same-sex wedding violated the
state’s anti-discrimination laws, the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission had violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.5 The
Commission, the Court wrote, had failed to treat Phillips’s
religious convictions in a neutral and respectful way.6 At least
two of the commissioners had publicly disparaged Phillips’s
religious convictions and none of the other commissioners
present had objected.7 Moreover, the Commission had acted
inconsistently in at least three prior cases involving other
bakers who had refused, on grounds of conscience, to create
cakes with anti-gay marriage sentiments. The Commission had
ruled that those bakers had acted lawfully in refusing service.
This inconsistency suggested that the state had not been
neutral with respect to the substance of Phillips’s convictions.
Punishing Phillips for refusing, on grounds of conscience, to
create a pro-gay marriage cake, while failing to punish other
bakers who declined, on grounds of conscience, to create antigay marriage cakes, suggested that the state simply disfavored
the content of Phillips’s convictions.8
Because the Commission had failed to treat Phillips’s
religious convictions in a neutral and respectful way, the Court
3. See Amy Howe, Argument preview: Wedding cakes v. religious beliefs?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2017, 3:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/
argument-preview-wedding-cakes-v-religious-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/H643-JXRH]
4. See Robert W. Tuttle & Ira C. Lupu, Masterpiece Cakeshop—A Troublesome
Application Of Free Exercise Principles By A Court Determined To Avoid Hard
Questions, TAKE CARE (June 7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiececakeshop-a-troublesome-application-of-free-exercise-principles-by-a-courtdetermined-to-avoid-hard-questions [https://perma.cc/3Z67-WWY4] (“[M]ost
observers believed that the Free Exercise Clause issues would not be crucial to the
disposition of the case.”).
5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
6. Id. at 1729.
7. Id. at 1729–30.
8. Id. at 1730–31. I discuss the Court’s reasoning on this point further below. See
infra pp. 720–21.
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held, its action against him violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.9 The Court stressed that future cases, in
which state authorities had not demonstrated overt hostility to
a claimant’s religious convictions, might well reach a different
result—a fact that Justice Kagan stressed in a concurring
opinion.10 Masterpiece Cakeshop thus does relatively little to
resolve the conflict between anti-discrimination laws and the
right of business owners to decline, out of sincere religious
conviction, to provide services in connection with same-sex
weddings.11
Masterpiece Cakeshop is nonetheless important for what it
reveals about deeper cultural and political trends, all related,
that will affect the future course of the law. Two cultural trends
are important: religious polarization and an expanding concept
of equality. Over the past two decades, American religion has
become polarized between two groups, the Nones, who reject
organized religion as authoritarian and hypocritical, especially
with respect to sexuality, and the Traditionally Religious, who
continue to adhere to organized religion and to traditional
religious teachings, especially with respect to sexuality.12 Each
group views the other’s values as threatening and
incomprehensible. Neither is going away, and neither seems in
a mind to compromise—including in commercial life.13 This
religious polarization has figured very prominently in the
public’s response to Masterpiece Cakeshop and similar
controversies.
Masterpiece Cakeshop also reflects a second cultural trend, one
that Alexis de Tocqueville—whose work runs like a red thread
through our story—saw long ago: an expanding notion of
9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731–32.
10. Id. at 1732; id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).
11. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132
HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) (noting that the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court “ducked
central questions” in the case).
12. On the Nones generally, see Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in
American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones (Robert Schuman Ctr. for
Advanced Studies, Research Paper No. 2014/19, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399470 [https://perma.cc/8AMF-H3AW].
13. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 183 (2014)
(observing that, with respect to LGBT issues, “the marketplace itself has become a
site of social contestation rather than a refuge from the culture wars”).
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equality.14 Increasing numbers of Americans endorse a
capacious concept of equality—“equality as sameness”—that
treats social distinctions, especially religious distinctions, as
arbitrary and unimportant.15 Asserting the importance of
religious boundaries, as Jack Phillips did, seems unreasonable
to growing numbers of our fellow citizens. Asserting such
boundaries strikes them—as it did Charlie Craig and Dave
Mullins, and at least some of the Colorado commissioners—as
deeply insulting, an affront to human dignity. That so many of
the actors in Masterpiece Cakeshop could not credit Jack
Phillips’s assertions of good faith explains much of what
happened in the case, and much of what is likely to happen in
future cases.
Finally, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects an important political
trend: the steady growth of an activist state committed to the
idea of equality as sameness. At both the federal and state
level, administrative agencies work to promote equality in all
areas of life. Their actions increasingly impinge on the
Traditionally Religious, who face an expanding set of rules and
policies, backed by serious sanctions, which promote new
understandings of equality, particularly with respect to sex and
gender. The actions of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
offer a very good example. Although state officials will not
likely demonstrate the same overt hostility to traditional
religious beliefs in future cases, they will likely remain
committed to the same expansive view of equality. As a result,
conflicts between our anti-discrimination laws, on the one
hand, and the religious beliefs of millions of American citizens,
on the other, will continue.
As Tocqueville famously observed, American political
questions inevitably become judicial ones.16 Conflicts like the
one in Masterpiece Cakeshop will continue to find their way into
14. On Tocqueville and equality, see infra at 731–32.
15. See Samuel Gregg, Equality in Democracy: Tocqueville’s Prediction of a Falling
America, CNS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/
commentary/samuel-gregg/equality-democracy-tocquevilles-prediction-fallingamerica [https://perma.cc/S8LN-TKCR].
16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA I.ii.8, at 257 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840)
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA] (“There is almost no political question in
the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question”).
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our courts. How will the courts resolve them? The law with
respect to religious accommodations is currently something of
a “patchwork.”17 Different jurisdictions employ different tests
in different circumstances. Nonetheless, the leading test
remains the so-called “compelling interest” test, which holds
that the government may impose a substantial burden on a
person’s religious exercise only if the government has a
compelling interest in doing so and has chosen the least
restrictive means.18 Notwithstanding Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
somewhat unusual resolution, the compelling interest test will
probably determine the outcome in most future cases.
But the compelling interest test presents significant
difficulties.19 The test turns controversies about religious
accommodation into judgment calls, the outcomes of which
depend, practically speaking, on the intuitions of the people
doing the judging.20 In a polarized society like ours, with
deeply divergent understandings about the nature and value of
religion and the scope of equality, intuitions about “substantial
burden” and “compelling interest” vary widely from person to
person—and from judge to judge.21 The test makes it very hard
to predict what result will obtain in any particular case and
makes judges’ identity, background, and prior normative

17. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 149
(2016).
18. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3,
107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012)). On the current
status of the compelling interest test, see MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 198.
See also W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION:
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 231 (2010). I discuss
the compelling interest test further below. See infra pp. 745–47.
19. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting the compelling
interest test for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause); see also William P. Marshall,
Bad Statutes Make Bad Law, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (reviewing problems with the
compelling interest test).
20. See Mark L. Movsesian, The Powerful Headwinds Confronting Religious Freedom,
L. & LIBERTY (May 2, 2018), https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/05/02/masterpiececakeshop-religious-freedom-nones/ [https://perma.cc/FC7F-LUTF].
21. In a related context, David Bernstein has written that the compelling interest
test may only serve as “an empty vessel for the justices’ moral intuitions.” David
E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
133, 167 (discussing freedom of association).
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commitments signally important.22 In short, the cultural and
political trends I have identified—growing religious
polarization, an expanded concept of equality, and an activist
state—suggest that conflicts between anti-discrimination norms
and the religious beliefs of millions of Americans will, if
anything, grow more frequent and bitter and that courts will
continue to have to resolve them. And the vague nature of the
compelling interest test suggests that the ultimate legal
resolution will remain unclear for a long time to come.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Court’s
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Part II explores the cultural
and political trends I have identified and shows how the
Masterpiece Cakeshop litigation reflects them. Part III concludes
and ventures three predictions: conflicts like Masterpiece
Cakeshop will grow more frequent and harder for our society to
negotiate; the law in this area will remain unsettled and deeply
contested; and the judicial confirmation wars will grow even
more bitter and partisan than they already are.
One clarification at the start: this Article is analytical rather
than normative. For what it is worth, Masterpiece Cakeshop
struck me as a difficult case. But my goal here is not to argue
the merits. Rather, I seek to illuminate the issues and make
some predictions about the future course of the law. Those
predictions may turn out to be wrong. But their correctness
does not depend on one’s views about which side should
prevail in the clash of important values that Masterpiece
Cakeshop represents: our society’s commitments both to nondiscrimination and to religious freedom.
I.

THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP DECISION

Masterpiece Cakeshop presents what has become a familiar
pattern in American commercial life. A gay couple asks a
vendor to provide services in connection with the couple’s
wedding—photography, flowers, invitations—which the
22. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University
Policies Against Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 393–94 (1994) (observing that
the balancing contemplated by the compelling interest test “invites judges to put
their personal values onto the scale”).
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vendor refuses on the basis of his religious convictions.23
Providing services for a gay wedding, he explains, would make
him complicit in conduct he considers sinful.24 The couple
objects that the vendor is denying service in violation of state
public-accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. The vendor responds that he is
willing to provide services to all customers, including the
couple, whether they are gay or straight. But he declines to
participate in gay weddings, because gay weddings violate his
religious beliefs.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a gay couple, Charlie Craig and Dave
Mullins, asked a Colorado cake designer, Jack Phillips—the
owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop—to create a cake for their
wedding celebration.25 The couple didn’t specify exactly what
they wished the cake to say, or, in fact, whether they wanted an
inscription on the cake at all.26 But they did want a custom cake
that Phillips would design especially for their wedding. They
were not interested in the off-the-shelf baked goods that
Phillips offered to sell them.27
Phillips, a conservative Christian with traditional views
about marriage, declined to fill their order, explaining that
creating a cake for a gay wedding would violate his religious
convictions. Creating such a cake, he said, would amount to his
“participat[ing] in” and “personally endors[ing]” a relationship
he considered unbiblical.28 Indeed, the subsequent
investigation by the state civil rights authorities revealed that
Phillips had a policy against creating cakes for gay weddings
and had declined to do so several times in the past.29 He had
also refused, out of religious conviction, “to bake cakes

23. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 133–34 (discussing cases).
24. On complicity claims generally, compare Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L.J. 2516 (2015), with Joshua J. Craddock, The Case for Complicity-Based
Religious Accommodations, 12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018).
25. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1724 (2018).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1726.
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containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages,
cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween.”30
Shortly after Phillips rejected their order, Craig and Mullins
began an administrative action against him (and Masterpiece
Cakeshop) by filing a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Division, the state agency responsible for enforcing Colorado’s
Anti-Discrimination Act, or CADA.31 Like many similar laws
across the country, CADA prohibits places of public
accommodation from refusing customers equal service on the
basis of sexual orientation, among other things.32 The Division
investigated Phillips, found probable cause that he had
violated CADA, and referred the case to another state agency,
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which in turn referred
the case to an administrative law judge, who held a hearing
and determined that Phillips had violated CADA by
discriminating against Craig and Mullins on the basis of sexual
orientation.33
Phillips appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Commission itself,
which held two public meetings in his case. At both meetings,
but especially at the second, individual commissioners made
remarks dismissing and disparaging Phillips’s religious
convictions.34 One commissioner suggested that, if Phillips’s
religious beliefs prevented him from complying with
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law, Phillips might find another
place to do business.35 Another likened Phillips’s stance to
historical episodes in which religion had been used to justify
violent acts of oppression, including slavery and the
Holocaust.36 This commissioner described Phillips’s religious
objection to same-sex marriage as simply a way to injure gay
30. Id. at 1745 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
31. Id. at 1725 (majority opinion).
32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).
33. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
34. Id. at 1729.
35. The “commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to
believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the
state.’ A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: ‘[I]f a
businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the
law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to
compromise.’” Id. (citations omitted).
36. Id.
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people and “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric
people can use.”37 The Supreme Court made much of these
remarks in its eventual decision.
The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and ruled
against Phillips.38 It ordered him to stop refusing orders for
wedding cakes from gay couples and to provide
“comprehensive staff training” at his shop on CADA and on
the requirements of the Commission’s ruling against him.39 In
addition, it required him to file compliance reports with the
Commission on a quarterly basis for two years. The reports
were to provide the Commission with details about how many
people Phillips had refused to serve and the reasons for his
refusals, among other things.40
When the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected his appeal of
the Commission’s order, Phillips sought review in the United
States Supreme Court, arguing that requiring him to create
wedding cakes for gay couples violated both his free speech
and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.41 When
the Supreme Court granted review, most observers thought the
Court would focus on Phillips’s free speech claim. His free
exercise claim seemed precluded by the Court’s landmark
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that the
Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a neutral, generally
applicable law that incidentally burdens a citizen’s religious
exercise.42 CADA certainly seemed to be such a law: it
amounted to a blanket prohibition on discrimination in places
of public accommodation, whether the motivation for the
discrimination was religious or not.43 Further, the Court’s Civil

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1726.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Brief for Petitioners at 14–15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111).
42. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
43. In relevant part, CADA provides:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group,
because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the
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Rights Era jurisprudence suggested that, at least with respect to
racial discrimination, religious objections would not exempt
public accommodations from anti-discrimination laws.44 To
most observers, Phillips’s chance of succeeding on a free
exercise claim seemed remote.45
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Court ruled, 7-2, that
the Commission had violated Phillips’s free exercise rights, not
so much in its ultimate decision against him, but in its decisionmaking process. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
explained that the Free Exercise Clause gave Phillips the right
to a neutral decision maker.46 But the Commission had not been
neutral at all. In fact, it had shown a clear bias against him—
that is, against his sincere religious beliefs. As evidence, Justice
Kennedy adduced the commissioners’ official comments in the
case, especially the remark about the “despicable” nature of
Phillips’s religious convictions against same-sex weddings.47 In
addition, he noted that the Commission had in prior cases
allowed bakers to decline, on the basis of conscience,
customers’ orders for cakes with messages opposing gay
marriage. This disparate treatment suggested that the
Commission had ruled against Phillips simply because the
Commission was hostile to the substance of Phillips’s religious
views.48
Because the Commission had not shown neutrality with
respect to Phillips’s sincere religious beliefs, Justice Kennedy
concluded, its decision against him violated the Free Exercise
Clause.49 This conclusion, too, was a bit of a surprise, since it
seemed to leave out a step. Most commentators had
understood the Court’s 1993 decision in Church of Lukumi

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a
place of public accommodation.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
44. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam).
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
47. Id. at 1729. For an argument that the Court misinterpreted these comments,
see Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 135.
48. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31.
49. Id. at 1731–32.
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Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah50 to require strict scrutiny in
circumstances where the state had not been neutral with
respect to religion: a state could burden religion in a nonneutral way only for a compelling reason and through the least
restrictive means of doing so.51 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch
assumed as much in his concurring opinion, which applied the
compelling interest test to invalidate the Commission’s
decision.52 But Justice Kennedy skipped the compelling interest
analysis altogether.
Justice Kennedy also left unresolved the question of what
would happen if a state agency did not demonstrate overt bias
against a claimant’s religion. Presumably, in many cases in
which state agencies apply anti-discrimination laws to vendors,
officials do not make on-the-record comments disparaging the
vendors’ sincere religious convictions, and do not have a
record of ruling inconsistently in prior disputes.53 The Court
would decide any such future cases, Justice Kennedy said, on
the basis of the particular circumstances.54 About the only
guidance the Court was willing to give was this: courts would
have to strike a balance between the right of religious persons
to have their beliefs respected and the right of gay persons to
obtain goods and services in the marketplace without suffering
affronts.55
Masterpiece Cakeshop ultimately settled fairly little, and the
fight over future cases already has begun.56 Indeed, the
50. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
51. Id. at 546; see also, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine:
Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 375 (2010).
52. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
53. Cf. Kendrick and Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 150 (“Going forward, state
civil rights enforcement agencies have the chance to try again, while avoiding the
mistakes of the [Colorado] Commission.”).
54. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
55. Id.
56. Only two weeks after the Court ruled in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission sanctioned Jack Phillips for refusing to create a cake for
a transgender celebration. See Amy B. Wang, Baker claims religious persecution
again—this time after denying cake for transgender woman, WASH. POST (Aug. 15,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/08/15/bakerclaims-religious-persecution-again-this-time-after-denying-cake-for-transgenderwoman/
[https://perma.cc/A4MN-NZGK].
The
Commission
ultimately
determined not to move forward with the case, as part of a settlement with
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separate opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggest where the
battle lines may be drawn for the many complicated issues
future cases will raise.57 Still, although it did not resolve
matters, the decision reveals important cultural and political
trends that will likely drive future cases. I turn to those trends
now.
II.

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN MASTERPIECE
CAKESHOP
A.

Religious Polarization: The Nones vs. the
Traditionally Religious

Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects two important cultural trends.
The first is a growing polarization between two groups in
American religious life: the Nones and the Traditionally
Religious. The second is an expanding notion of equality, one
that goes beyond the anti-discrimination norms of the Civil
Rights Movement, which opposed the state’s differential
treatment of persons on the basis of race and other
characteristics, to a more general rejection of social distinctions,
especially including those grounded in religion. This Article
addresses each of these trends in turn.
The rise of the Nones is perhaps the most talked-about
development in American sociology in the last decade.58
“Nones” are those people who describe their religion in
surveys as “none” or “nothing in particular”—people who say
they have no religious affiliation at all.59 According to the most
recent Pew Research Center study in 2014, about 23% of
Americans adults now fall within this category, an increase of
about seven percent from the previous survey in 2007.60 In
Phillips. Chris Mills Rodrigo, State of Colorado, baker in same-sex wedding case agree
to end litigation, THE HILL (Mar. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/regulation/courtbattles/432722-state-of-colorado-baker-in-same-sex-wedding-case-agree-to-end.
57. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1734
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. Much of this discussion of the Nones derives from my earlier work.
Movsesian, supra note 12.
59. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 1.
60. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 20 (2015)
[hereinafter
AMERICA’S
CHANGING
RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE],
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historical terms, this percentage is extremely large. In the 1950s,
only three percent of Americans said they had no religious
identity.61 According to the Pew survey, Nones now qualify as
the second largest “religious” group in the country, after
Protestants and ahead of Catholics—though, when aggregated,
Christian faiths still claim the large majority of Americans,
about 70%.62
Among Millennials, the percentage of Nones is significantly
higher than in the general population. Pew divides Millennials
into two cohorts, “Older Millennials,” born between the years
1981 and 1989, and “Younger Millennials,” born between the
years 1990 and 1996.63 Among Older Millenials, the percentage
of Nones is 34%, up nine points from 2007; among Younger
Millennials, the percentage is even higher—36%.64 These
numbers are significant because of what sociologists refer to as
the “generational replacement” effect.65 As older Americans
with relatively strong religious commitments die off, younger,
less affiliated Americans gradually will take their place. As a
result, over time, Nones will make up an increasingly large
percentage of the population. It is true that people often
become more religious as they age, and today’s Millennials
may do so as well. At the moment, though, they are not
following that pattern. In terms of indicators such as church
attendance and prayer, older Millennials “are, if anything, less
religiously observant today than they were” just seven years
ago.66
To be sure, some sociologists question whether the
percentages are really as high as these surveys indicate.67
Baylor University sociologist Rodney Stark, for example,
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
(select “Complete Report PDF”) [https://perma.cc/2CBC-YA4P].
61. MARK CHAVES, AMERICAN RELIGION 15 (2d. ed. 2017).
62. AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 60, at 3–4.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. PUBLIC BECOMING LESS RELIGIOUS 24 (2015)
[hereinafter
U.S.
PUBLIC
BECOMING
LESS
RELIGIOUS],
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/
(select
“Complete Report PDF”) [https://perma.cc/3ZC7-ML8G].
67. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 1.
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believes that surveys overstate the numbers of Nones in
America today; some respondents apparently list their religion
as “None” to indicate that “they do not belong to a specific
church”—that is, when they are non-denominational
Christians.68 (Some anecdotal evidence: When I presented an
earlier version of this Article at a conference at the Notre Dame
Center on Ethics and Culture, one audience member
approached me afterwards to say that he would describe
himself as a “None,” even though he was a Christian, precisely
because he had never formally joined any church
congregation). Whatever the precise numbers may be, most
sociologists take the rise of the Nones to be a “‘highly reliable’
statistical finding” with implications for the future of American
religion.69
Most Nones do not reject religious belief as such. The
majority of them in the 2014 Pew survey, 61%, say they believe
in God or a universal spirit—though that percentage represents
a decline from the 2007 survey, which showed that 70% of
Nones believed in God.70 About a third of Nones say that
religion is somewhat or very important in their lives—though,
again, that percentage is down a great deal since 2007, which
suggests that Nones are becoming more secular over time.71
What most characterizes Nones is a rejection of institutional
religion. The Nones are spiritual “Independents” who refuse to
join formal, authoritative religious communities, which they
see as coercive and stifling.72 Instead, Nones believe they can
fashion their own, personal religions from a variety of different
traditions—indeed, from traditions which present themselves
as opposed to one another. As Ross Douthat writes, the
memoirist Elizabeth Gilbert, whose bestseller, Eat Pray Love
helped popularize the concept of “spiritual but not religious”
in the first decade of this century, created her own, personal
68. Conversations: Rodney Stark, LAW AND RELIGION FORUM BLOG (Aug. 5, 2013),
https://lawandreligionforum.org/2013/08/05/conversations-rodney-stark/#more13283 [https://perma.cc/C5Y7-PEG6].
69. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting FRANK NEWPORT, GOD IS ALIVE AND
WELL 13 (2012)).
70. AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 60, at 47.
71. Id. at 15.
72. See Chaeyoon Lim et al., Secular and Liminal: Discovering Heterogeneity Among
Religious Nones, 49 J. SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 596, 597, 614 (2010).
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spirituality by combining elements from Hindu polytheism,
Christian monotheism, and Buddhist non-theism.73
Nones believe they can do this sort of thing for two reasons.
First, they reject the idea that any one religious tradition can be
uniquely true to the exclusion of all others. Exclusive claims of
religious authority strike them as an affront to reason and good
sense, as well as human freedom.74 Second, they believe that
the individual has the right to pick and choose among various
traditions and forge a spiritual path that works for him,
because the individual has God within him.75 Spiritual
enlightenment and peace come, not from submitting to external
religious authority, which inevitably squelches spiritual
authenticity, but from discerning and accepting the divine
guidance that exists within oneself.76 The individual, not the
religious community, has the right to judge what is true—or, at
least, what is true for him.
Religious Independents have always been part of American
life.77 In the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine wrote, “My own
mind is my own church,”78 a sentiment many twenty-first
century
Nones share. And the nineteenth-century
Transcendentalists sound, to today’s ears, a great deal like
Nones.79 In the past, though, this sort of religious idiosyncrasy
was essentially a fringe phenomenon.80 Today, by contrast,
Nones make up the second largest religious group in America,
and roughly a third of Millennials. For large numbers of our
fellow citizens, the conventional understanding of religion “as
a distinctive body of beliefs, a moral and ritual set of practices,
and the organizational structures surrounding ideas and ideals

73. ROSS DOUTHAT, BAD RELIGION: HOW WE BECAME A NATION OF HERETICS
218 (2012).
74. See Movsesian, supra note 12, at 2.
75. See DOUTHAT, supra note 73, at 4–5, 216–17.
76. See Movsesian, supra note 12, at 2.
77. Id. at 8.
78. KERRY S. WALTERS, THE AMERICAN DEISTS 213 (1992).
79. See DOUTHAT, supra note 73, at 217–19 (comparing Ralph Waldo Emerson
with contemporary spiritual guides like Deepak Chopra, Paulo Coelho, and
Oprah Winfrey).
80. See Movsesian, supra note 12, at 8.
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of the sacred,” no longer represents the norm.81 In fact, for
these citizens, traditional religion represents a malign force that
stifles authentic spirituality, creating inner turmoil and
preventing individuals from attaining their true potential.
Why should the rise of the Nones occur now, at the start of
the twenty-first century? Many factors exist, but three merit
special attention. First, there are demographic explanations.
Changes in family structure, and, in particular, high rates of
religious intermarriage and divorce have an important role.
About half of Americans who marry today choose a spouse of a
different religion.82 More than a quarter of Millennials say they
were raised in a religiously mixed family.83 As one would
expect, children from such families more often become Nones
when they grow up than children whose parents shared the
same religion.84 Moreover, Nones are themselves having and
raising children. Roughly one-quarter of Millennials in the Pew
survey report having been raised by at least one parent who
was a None; about six percent say both their parents were
Nones.85 A large percentage of these children also become
Nones when they reach adulthood—62% percent where both
parents were Nones.86 Parental divorce also appears to have a
role. Children of divorce are significantly less likely to identify
with a religion than children from intact families, perhaps
because they have less trust in institutions and authority
figures generally.87
Second, the rise of the Nones seems to be associated with the
Sexual Revolution, especially with changing views on
homosexuality. According to a 2017 Pew report, a solid
81. James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
1065, 1065 (2013).
82. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE 148 (2010).
83. PEW RESEARCH CTR., ONE-IN-FIVE U.S. ADULTS WERE RAISED IN INTERFAITH
HOMES 4 (2016) [hereinafter ONE-IN-FIVE U.S. ADULTS WERE RAISED IN INTERFAITH
HOMES],
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/10/26/one-in-five-u-s-adults-wereraised-in-interfaith-homes/ (select “Complete Report PDF”) [https://perma.cc/
LDA6-TWZN].
84. See Movsesian, supra note 12, at 9.
85. ONE-IN-FIVE U.S. ADULTS WERE RAISED IN INTERFAITH HOMES, supra note 83,
at at 4.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 9.
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majority of Americans, about 62% percent, now say that samesex marriage should be legal.88 Among Nones, however, the
percentage is strikingly high—85%.89 Here again, Millennials
are key. Young adults are driving the changing social
consensus on homosexuality, including among Nones.
Millennials generally have more positive views of
homosexuality than older Americans, and nearly 90% of
Millennial Nones say that society should accept
homosexuality.90 The Pew report also offers support for what
sociologists have been saying for years: young Nones dislike
organized religion because they associate it with traditional,
negative views about homosexuality, and because they believe
organized religion’s rejection of homosexuality masks
hypocrisy about sexual sins generally.91
Finally, the rise of the Nones in the twenty-first century may
reflect the gradual, but inevitable, working-out of the inner
logic of liberalism, America’s dominant political ideology. In
the nineteenth century, Tocqueville wrote that escaping the
hold of habit, family, and tradition were among the principal
features of the American mindset.92 More recently, Patrick
Deneen has observed that liberalism has always opposed
received authority, which it views as arbitrary and accidental,
in favor of individual autonomy and choice. Liberalism teaches
that loosening the bonds of family, community, and religion is
necessary in order to release the full potential of human
beings.93 Liberalism encourages the person to think of himself
as “primarily a free chooser” with respect to “all relationships,
institutions, and beliefs.”94 Over time, the ethos of choice
extends to more and more subjects. It is no surprise, then, in a
society where liberalism dominates, that many people
eventually come to see choice as extending to religious
institutions and beliefs.
88. Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/6WNN-A6SZ].
89. Id.
90. U.S. PUBLIC BECOMING LESS RELIGIOUS, supra note 66, at 35.
91. See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 82, at 130.
92. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.i.1, at 403.
93. See PATRICK DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 30 (2018).
94. Id. at 78.
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Nonetheless, the rise of the Nones does not mean that
religion is simply disappearing from American life. The
increase in the number of the religiously unaffiliated is
occurring simultaneously with an increase in religiosity among
Americans who do maintain a religious identity—a group one
might call the Traditionally Religious. According to the 2014
Pew survey, religiously affiliated Americans “appear to have
grown more religiously observant in recent years,” if one
considers things like Bible study and prayer groups.95 Another
recent survey shows that the percentage of “intensely
religious” Americans, with intensity being measured in terms
of indicators such as church attendance and frequent prayer,
has remained remarkably stable for decades.96 The percentage
of Americans with a “strong” religious affiliation has remained
steady, at a little less than 40%, since 1989.97
In other words, America is experiencing a deepening
religious polarization rather than a systematic falloff from
religion. The growing percentage of Nones does not result from
a general decrease in religious observance, but “a dramatic
decline” in the numbers of the “moderately religious”—people
who formally identify with a religion but who show only
modest levels of commitment.98 As in so many areas of
American life, the middle is dropping out in favor of the
extremes on either end. The moderately religious are rapidly
ending their affiliations and becoming Nones, while the
Traditionally Religious are maintaining their affiliations or
even increasing their intensity. We appear to be reaching a
point of rough parity. More than a fifth of Americans, and
more than a third of younger Americans, are now Nones, while
something like two-fifths of Americans are among the
Traditionally Religious.
This deepening polarization will exacerbate conflicts like the
one in Masterpiece Cakeshop and make it harder for our society
to negotiate them. Compromise requires an ability to
sympathize with the other side, to understand, even if one does
95. U.S. PUBLIC BECOMING LESS RELIGIOUS, supra note 66, at 6.
96. Landon Schnabel & Sean Bock, The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of
American Religion: A Response to Recent Research, 4 SOC. SCI. 686, 687–88 (2017).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 689.
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not share, the commitments that motivate one’s interlocutor. It
requires some common base of experience. Americans have not
always shown such sympathy for minority religious
communities, of course. At various times, Catholics, Jews, and
Mormons all have experienced hostility, among other religious
groups. But a general sympathy for religion and religious
claims has always marked American culture. In the past,
someone like Jack Phillips might have counted on a
widespread, if thin, sympathy with the idea of traditional
religious commitments. The vast majority of Americans would
have understood why he thought it so important to follow the
tenets of his religion, for the simple reason that the vast
majority of Americans would have had some connection with
institutional religion. Even if they were only nominally
religious, and even if they disagreed with his particular
convictions, most Americans would have understood why
Phillips insisted on acting as he did.
But this wider social sympathy for traditional religion is
fading. Large numbers of Americans no longer have experience
with traditional, organized religion—and, to the extent they do
have such experience, they reject it. Nones are unlikely to
respond sympathetically when the Traditionally Religious seek
exemptions from legal requirements.99 Indeed, Nones are likely
to see such exemptions as an unfair advantage for organized
religion. For their part, the Traditionally Religious are also
unlikely to sympathize with the worldview of the Nones.
Disagreements between the two groups will likely be amplified
by the fact that Nones overwhelmingly reject traditional
teachings on sexuality, which they see as psychologically
damaging and essentially unjust, while the Traditionally
Religious continue to endorse them as necessary for human
dignity.100 In short, we now have two fairly sizable, competing
groups with sharply divergent understandings of the
beneficence of traditional religious commitments, especially

99. See JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM 22–23 (2015).
100. See Mark L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517,
1529 (2016).
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with respect to sexuality—and neither group seems especially
interested in compromise.101
The public response to controversies like Masterpiece Cakeshop
reflects this religious polarization. In the summer of 2016, while
the Court was considering Jack Phillips’s cert petition, the Pew
Research Center surveyed Americans’ opinions on whether a
business should be obligated to provide services for a gay
wedding notwithstanding the owner’s religious objections.102
The responses closely tracked America’s religious divide.
About two-thirds of the religiously unaffiliated—the Nones—
said that a business should be required by law to provide
services for a gay wedding even if the owner had religious
objections.103 About two-thirds of Americans who attend
religious services frequently—the Traditionally Religious—said
that a business owner should not be required to do so.104 Only a
relatively small number of Americans, 18%, found it possible to
sympathize with both sides’ points of view.105 This sharp
religious divide suggests that achieving social consensus on
cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop will be extremely difficult.
B.

Equality as Sameness

Masterpiece Cakeshop also reflects a second cultural trend:
society’s expanding conception of equality. Equality has been
central to the American worldview ever since Jefferson
enshrined the concept in the Declaration of Independence. But
equality can mean different things. According to one
understanding, it refers to legal equality—to the fair and
uniform application of the law to all citizens.106 In the twentieth
101. On the unwillingness of both the LGBT community and the Traditionally
Religious to compromise in the marketplace, see, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Markets
and Morals: The Limits of Doux Commerce, 9 WM. & MARY. BUS. L. REV. 449, 472
(2018).
102. PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VS.
NONDISCRIMINATION (2016), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/where-thepublic-stands-on-religious-liberty-vs-nondiscrimination/ (select “Complete Report
PDF”) [https://perma.cc/BY4U-83ZC].
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 778–79
(1996) (distinguishing between “legal equality” and “actual equality”).
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century, America gradually extended legal equality to racial
and other minorities against whom it had discriminated, in
law, for centuries. This has been one of the great achievements
of our time.
However, equality can also refer to a broader unwillingness
to accept any distinctions among groups and individuals,
whether “material, social, or personal.”107 According to this
view, equality means a rejection of the idea of “difference per
se.”108 All boundaries that distinguish one group of people
from another—for example, beliefs and practices that mark out
a religious community and exclude non-members—are
presumptively suspect because of the implicit judgments they
suggest. Some groups apparently think their beliefs and ways
of life are superior to others. Such judgments seem impolite,
ungenerous, and inconsistent with the spirit of true equality,
which requires that each community acknowledge the basic
correctness and good will of all others. Suggesting that one
finds others’ beliefs and practices morally inferior is, on this
view, a grave affront to human dignity. Notwithstanding
societal claims to respect diversity, it is this second concept of
equality—“equality as sameness”109—that pervades our culture
today, especially with respect to religion.
Once again, Tocqueville saw this coming. Equality, he
observed, was Americans’ most fundamental moral
commitment, the criterion by which we judged everything
else.110 Equality required that social distinctions be ignored—
between aristocrats and common men, the educated and the
unschooled, man and woman, parent and child. In law, it
called for uniformity;111 in philosophy and religion, for

107. Patrick Deneen, Alexis de Tocqueville, FIRST PRINCIPLES (March 14, 2011),
http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/print.aspx?article=911&loc=b&type=cbtp
[https://perma.cc/WRH7-AUYM].
108. See Gregg, supra note 15.
109. Id.
110. See DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, I:Introduction, at 3 (“[A]s I
studied American society, more and more I saw in equality of conditions the
generative fact from which each particular fact seemed to issue.”); see also PIERRE
MANENT, TOCQUEVILLE AND THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY (John Waggoner trans.,
Rowman & Littlefield 1996) (1982).
111. See DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.iv.2, at 641; id. II.iv.3, at 645.
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generality rather than a focus on the particular.112 In fact, with
respect to religion, the preference for generality ultimately
worked to minimize distinctions between particular faith
traditions and promote pantheism, which not only denied the
relevance of difference in the created order, but also the
distinction between creation and the Creator Himself.113
The emphasis on religious equality did not result in
widespread pantheism in Tocqueville’s time. Christianity had
too powerful a hold on nineteenth-century Americans for that
to happen.114 Today, however, his predictions seem to be
coming true. Americans are remarkably broad-minded about
the legitimacy of all religions. A 2010 study by sociologists
Robert Putnam and David Campbell reveals that almost 90% of
Americans believe that members of other religions, not only
their own, can go to Heaven.115 Nuances exist, and much
depends on how people understand the question. The
percentage goes down, for example, when surveyors ask
Christians whether non-Christians (as opposed to different
kinds of Christians) can go to Heaven.116 And much depends
on how respondents understand the question. Some Christians
would say, for example, that Christianity is the unique path to
salvation, but members of other faiths may be on the path
without knowing it. Other Christians would say that it’s
possible for non-Christians to go to Heaven, but rare. Still, it is
noteworthy that the large majority of American Christians,
even those who belong to churches that teach that Christianity
is the exclusive path to salvation, believe that non-Christians
can, in principle, receive eternal life.
Putnam and Campbell ascribe this remarkable ecumenism to
a number of factors, including the large number of mixedreligious families in America, which tend to mute religious
distinctions (how could my saintly “Aunt Susan” not go to
112. Id. II.iv.2, at 640.
113. Id. II.i.7, at 425–26.
114. An “innumerable multitude of sects” existed in America, he noted, but all
were “within the great Christian unity.” Id. at I.ii.9, at 278; see also id. II.i.1., at 406
(“In the United States, Christian sects vary infinitely and are constantly modified,
but Christianity itself is an established and irresistible fact that no one undertakes
either to attack or defend.”).
115. PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 82, at 534.
116. See id. at 536.

No. 3]

The Future of Religious Freedom

733

Heaven just because she’s not a Christian?), and the inevitable
social interactions between people from different religions in
daily life (“My Friend Al” is an evangelical Christian, but he’s
not a bad guy).117 These explanations seem to have things
backwards: it is the norm of tolerance that lets Aunt Susan
marry into the family in the first place, and allows one to have
a friend from a different faith tradition. Whatever the reasons,
when it comes to perhaps the most important religious
question of all, Americans show a remarkably latitudinarian
attitude. With respect to attaining salvation, and with the
qualifications I suggest above, most Americans seem to believe
that all ways are equally good.
One the one hand, the concept of equality as sameness may
make conflicts like the one in Masterpiece Cakeshop less likely. If
people perceive all ways as equally good, they will not have
problems participating in all sorts of celebrations, whatever
their religious convictions. On the other hand, when such
conflicts do occur, an expansive concept of equality will make
them more bitter and harder to resolve. To refuse to participate
in someone else’s wedding on religious grounds is to erect a
boundary that seems socially incomprehensible. It is to express
a judgment that the life events of other citizens are so
opprobrious that one cannot take part in them. Such a
judgment violates the principle of “equality as sameness” and,
as a result, is likely to be taken as a deep insult to the dignity of
other citizens.
If I may offer a personal anecdote, I recently posed a
hypothetical case in my Law and Religion class.118 Suppose, I
asked the students, an observant Jew has a florist shop. One
day, a customer, who is also Jewish, comes to the shop to say
she’s getting married and would like the florist to do the
wedding. “That’s wonderful,” the florist says. “Where will you
get married?” The customer replies that the wedding will be at
a local nondenominational church, because her fiancé is
Christian, and she, the customer, isn’t very observant. The
florist thinks about it and says, “I’m so sorry, but I can’t do
117. Id. at 526, 531.
118. I related this anecdote in a blog post. Mark Movsesian, Passion for Equality, FIRST
THINGS (July 10, 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2017/07/passionfor-equality [https://perma.cc/2SRF-ETCE].
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your wedding. It’s nothing personal; I’m sure your fiancé is a
fine person, as are you. It’s just that as an observant Jew, I don’t
approve of interfaith weddings. For our community to survive,
we must avoid intermarriage and assimilation. Please
understand. There are many other florists who can do your
wedding. I’ll even suggest some. But I can’t, in good
conscience, participate.” What result?
In posing this hypothetical, I was trying to show the students
that these are complicated questions and that they need to
consider both sides. Much to my surprise, the students were
uniformly unsympathetic to the florist. There should be no
legal right to decline services in this situation, they told me: the
florist was not acting reasonably and in good faith. I pressed
them. Didn’t they see that genuine religious diversity requires
respect for difference, that difference implies boundaries, and
that boundaries necessarily exclude? Couldn’t a member of a
minority religion believe, in good faith, that her community
faced assimilation and decline to run her business in a way that
promoted it? Wasn’t that a concern worthy of respect? No, they
told me. The florist in my hypothetical case should have no
right to turn away the interfaith couple.
I have thought about the students’ reaction, and it seems to
me that it results from the students’ sense that it is wrong to
draw religious distinctions that exclude others and injure their
dignity, no matter what the justification. That is what the florist
did in my hypothetical case—and that, I think, was what
bothered the students. The florist was violating the “equality as
sameness” principle, and my students simply did not think her
concerns justified her in doing so.
Something similar, I believe, occurred in Masterpiece Cakeshop
itself. Craig and Mullins viewed Phillips’s objection to creating
their wedding cake as an insult, no matter how much he
protested about the good will he bore them, and no matter how
willing he was to sell them goods off the shelf.119 They
experienced an affront so deep that, rather than obtain a cake
somewhere else, as they easily could have done, they sought

119. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1724 (2018).
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vindication by the state and pursued a lengthy litigation.120
And the members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
agreed with them about the depth of the insult, especially the
one commissioner who compared Phillips’s objections to
historical episodes like slavery and the Holocaust.121 Like the
florist in my classroom hypothetical, Phillips had violated the
“equality as sameness” principle. His claim that he could not in
good conscience participate in a gay wedding, because that
would make him complicit in activity his religion regarded as
sinful, erected a boundary that increasing numbers of
Americans find rebarbative.122
C.

The Activist State

The third trend that Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects is a political
one: the rise of activist administrative agencies at both the
federal and state levels. The growth of government over the
course of the twentieth century, starting with the Progressives
in the early 1900s, picking up steam in the New Deal of the
1930s, and continuing in the Great Society of the 1960s, has
been much discussed.123 Notwithstanding occasional resistance
by Presidents and governors, the welfare state, “characterized
by a high level of government action in all phases of economic
and social life,” is an inescapable fact of contemporary
American politics.124 Government rules affect virtually every
aspect of our society, including commerce, communications,
consumer transactions, education (at all levels), employment,
food, health and safety, land use, and professional
qualifications.
The expanding scope of the federal government illustrates
the trend. Since the so-called “New Deal Settlement” of the
120. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (Kennedy, J.) (noting
availability of other bakeries to fill the couple’s order).
121. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
122. See id. at 1724 (“To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to
his own most deeply held beliefs.”). For sources on complicity arguments
generally, see supra note 24.
123. See, e.g., JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA (2017).
124. Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 375, 375 (1990).
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1930s, the federal government has had more or less plenary
legislative power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.125
The Court has occasionally suggested, most recently in the first
Obamacare case, some limits to the Commerce Clause power,
but it has not reconsidered the basic understanding.126 The
Court has also allowed Congress effectively unlimited
discretion in delegating authority to executive branch agencies,
and has allowed those agencies considerable discretion in
interpreting congressional mandates.127 As a result, “[t]here is
now virtually no significant aspect of life that is not in some
way regulated by the federal government.”128 Federal “agencies
wield immense influence in shaping the conduct of individuals
and organizations.”129
Numbers tell part of the story. Consider federal government
expenditures, which serve as a rough proxy for the state’s
growing role in the American economy. If we focus on
entitlement spending—programs like Medicare and Social
Security—the increase since the New Deal is remarkable.
Adjusting for inflation and population growth, the federal
government spends about fifteen times more today on
entitlements than it did in 1940.130 Federal spending on
entitlements far outstrips spending on other government
functions, such as national defense.131 Or consider another
number, the page count of the Federal Register, “the daily
repository of all proposed and final federal rules and

125. On the “New Deal Settlement,” see Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v.
Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
126. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). For a good
overview of the doctrine, see Solum, supra note 125.
127. On delegation, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). On agency deference, see id. at 1247; Jeffrey
A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 799, 802–04 (2010).
128. Lawson, supra note 127, at 1236.
129. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 112, 114 (2011).
130. WILLIAM VOEGELI, NEVER ENOUGH: AMERICA’S LIMITLESS WELFARE STATE
25 (2010). Voegeli’s figures exclude veterans’ programs and benefits, id. at 22, and
measure the years 1940–2007.
131. See id. at 31–33.
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regulations.”132 The Federal Register for the year 2016 came to
almost 100,000 pages, “the highest level in its history,” about
20% higher than the previous year’s edition.133 Page counts are
an imperfect measure of government activity, of course.134 But,
as a rough guide, they do indicate the increasing activity of
federal agencies. And, again, these numbers relate only to the
federal government, not to state governments, which retain
plenary legislative jurisdiction in our constitutional system.
To be sure, the current administration has announced a
deregulation campaign at the federal level—“a fundamental
shift” in policy which, among other things, directs “federal
agencies to eliminate two regulations for each new one
implemented and to reduce new regulatory costs to zero.”135 As
Adam White writes, however, this “very, very good start” faces
substantial obstacles, including inevitable legal challenges.136
Moreover, “the next Democratic administration could undo
much of the Trump administration’s deregulatory effort every
bit as quickly as the Trump administration undid the Obama
administration’s regulatory actions.”137 It will take more than a
few years of deregulation to stop the expansion of
government—and the current efforts at the federal level will
have no impact at all at the state level. Claims that “the era of
big government is over” have misled people in the past.138

132. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TEN
THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY
STATE
16
(2017),
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/
Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3DKCBULV]; see also MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 77 (using page count of
Federal Register to illustrate growth of government).
133. CREWS, supra note 132, at 3, 16.
134. Id. at 16.
135. NEOMI RAO, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INTRODUCTION TO
FALL 2017 REGULATORY PLAN (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/
THE
public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201710/VPStatement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73C2-BCQU].
136. Adam J. White, Trumping the Administrative State, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan.
19, 2018, 4:25 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/trumpingthe-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/HJ62-FG8U].
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, One(?) Nation Overextended, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1109,
1120 (2014).
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The growth of activist administrative agencies figures
prominently in controversies like Masterpiece Cakeshop. In part,
it is simply a matter of volume. The more regulations, and the
more subjects covered, the greater the potential for businesses
to violate the law.139 As Marc DeGirolami writes, where
“government assumes an increasingly large role in the life of
the citizenry, more injuries are transformed into legally (and
perhaps even constitutionally) cognizable rights.”140 But the
volume of regulation alone does not explain things. The
content matters, too. For reasons I will explain, administrative
agencies inherently tend to favor the expansive concept of
equality I have described. As a consequence, conflicts between
the administrative state and the Traditionally Religious are apt
to occur much more frequently.
Once again, Tocqueville offers useful insights as to why this
should be so. Egalitarian democracies, he believed, tend to
encourage a powerful state—because they promote an
individualism that is unsustainable without it.141 In a
democracy, the individual learns to rely on his own judgment,
not received wisdom, in making his life choices.142 He learns to
see himself as equal to everyone else; he sees no reason to defer
to other people’s judgments or to the wisdom of traditional
authority.143 But this individualism, paradoxically, promotes a
powerful state. The individual will from time to time feel his
weakness and need the help of others. Subjecting oneself to
one’s equals, or to traditional authority, would be unthinkable;
but subjecting oneself to a state that stands alone above

139. See Epstein, supra note 124, at 375; see also MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17,
at 77 (“In a society that is pervasively regulated as ours now is, there are many
more occasions for conflict between the government and religious believers.”).
140. Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105,
131 (2016); see also Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015).
141. For a discussion of individualism, by which Tocqueville meant a kind of
withdrawal from and indifference to the affairs of other citizens, see DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.ii.2, at 482–84.
142. “The inhabitant of the United States learns from birth that he must rely on
himself to struggle against the evils and obstacles of life; he has only a defiant and
restive regard for social authority and appeals to its power only when he cannot
do without it.” Id. I.ii.4, at 180.
143. See id. at II.iv.1; id. at II.iv.3.
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everyone would not only be thinkable but necessary.144 Of the
citizen in an egalitarian democracy, Tocqueville wrote:
His independence fills him with confidence and pride
among his equals, and his debility makes him feel, from time
to time, the need of the outside help that he cannot expect
from any of them, since they are all impotent and cold. In
this extremity, he naturally turns his regard to the immense
being that rises in the midst of universal debasement. His
needs and above all his desires constantly lead him back
toward it, and in the end he views it as the unique and
necessary support for individual weakness.145

Only a powerful state has the ability to protect and provide for
the individual who has abandoned traditional sources of
belonging and authority.
Tocqueville thought that American democracy overcame this
tendency to statism through its commitment to private
associations, including religious associations, which provided
competing sources of loyalty that kept the state in check.146 But,
over time, a democratic state will find such associations a
threat and try to weaken them, all in the interests of human
flourishing.147 As Patrick Deneen writes, the logic of liberal
democracy requires an activist state that breaks the hold of
traditional authorities in order to promote a salutary personal
autonomy. Individualism and the activist state thus reinforce
one another—“a virtuous circle,” from the perspective of
liberalism.148 In Tocqueville’s words, the state willingly works
for each individual’s happiness, asking in return only the
authority to “knead him as it likes” and have the final say on
what happiness shall mean.149
In short, over time, a democratic state will tend to promote
the “equality as sameness” principle through its administrative
apparatus. The state will encourage people to think of
144. See id. at II.iv.3.
145. Id. at II.iv.3, at 644 (footnote omitted).
146. Movsesian, supra note 12, at 14.
147. See DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.ii.4, at 485 (“Despotism,
which in its nature is fearful, sees the most certain guarantee of its own duration
in the isolation of men, and it ordinarily puts all its care into isolating them.”); see
also Movsesian, supra note 12, at 14.
148. DENEEN, supra note 93, at 59.
149. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 16, II.iv.6, at 663.
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themselves only as citizens and abandon traditional sources of
identity that distinguish them.150 It will work to break down the
social boundaries that groups, including the Traditionally
Religious, erect to maintain their distinctiveness and preserve
their values. Indeed, as Philip Hamburger writes, in
contemporary America, it is the small-o “orthodox” who need
most to worry about government action—those “minorities
that seek to preserve their distinctive beliefs in the face of
majoritarian pressures to conform to more universal liberal
views.”151 In a society like ours, which prizes equality and
which deeply suspects tradition and communal authority,
“orthodoxy” is itself “unorthodox,”152 even when people
voluntarily choose it, and therefore occasions serious conflicts
that our courts ultimately must resolve.
In twenty-first century America, this dynamic appears in
various actions by government agencies that impinge on
traditional religious associations and identities. Government
has always impinged on the activities of religious associations
in America to some degree, of course, going back to the early
Republic.153 But the potential for conflict has become much
larger today. The Traditionally Religious face an expanding set
of rules and policies that promote new understandings of
equality, particularly with respect to sexuality and gender,
along with an ever-expanding bureaucracy dedicated to
enforcing them.154 As Richard Epstein writes, civil rights offices
exist today “in virtually every government agency, most
notably in the agencies that regulate housing, education, and

150. Cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 615 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“A Christian, a Jew, a Muslim (and so forth)—each stands in the same
relationship with her country, with her state and local communities, and with
every level and body of government. So that when each person performs the
duties or seeks the benefits of citizenship, she does so not as an adherent to one or
another religion, but simply as an American.”).
151. Philip Hamburger, Exclusion and Equality: How Exclusion from the Political
Process Renders Religious Liberty Unequal, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1929 (2015).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church
Property and Power before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 311 (2014).
154. On the centrality of sexuality in contemporary conflicts over religious
liberty, see Horwitz, supra note 13, at 160.
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employment.”155 The Traditionally Religious face increasing
pressure to accept the new understandings and comply with
the new rules, or face a “looming threat of a wide range of legal
sanctions.”156
Masterpiece Cakeshop offers a good example. The Colorado
Civil Rights Commission ruled against Jack Phillips in order to
promote equality for same-sex marriage, a concept that
relatively few would have endorsed even a decade ago, even
on the progressive left.157 It imposed significant regulatory
burdens on him, including training and quarterly reporting
requirements that would have demanded significant time and
money.158 One commissioner even hinted that, with views like
his, maybe Phillips should think about doing business in a
different state.159 Phillips decided to resist. But not many
businesses will do so. Not many will be willing to bear such
burdens or to relocate. The more likely result will be that
Traditionally Religious businesspeople like Phillips abandon,
or at least soften, their convictions in order to make a living. Of
course, the commissioners were trying to promote human
flourishing and protect gay couples from indignities in the
marketplace; that is not the point. The point is that in imposing
these burdens, the Commission acted in a way calculated to
advance the principle of equality as sameness and weaken the
hold of traditional religious commitments. As Rod Dreher
writes, we can anticipate many more such conflicts in the
future.160

155. Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An
Imperfect Reconciliation, L. & LIBERTY (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.libertylawsite.org/
liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-an-imperfectreconciliation/ [https://perma.cc/N6RS-XNDT].
156. Id.
157. President Obama notably did not endorse marriage equality in his first
campaign in 2008, though he did endorse it in time for his second. Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Missing Links in the President’s Evolution on Same-Sex Marriage,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 554 (2012).
158. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1726 (2018).
159. Id. at 1729.
160. On the challenges conservative Christians, in particular, may expect to face
in the marketplace, see ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR
CHRISTIANS IN A POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 179–94 (2017).
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CONCLUSION: AFTER MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP

In short, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects important cultural and
political trends. Those trends will continue to shape future
conflicts between anti-discrimination norms, on the one hand,
and religious freedom, on the other—disputes, to paraphrase
Justice Kennedy, which set the right of gays and lesbians to
obtain goods and services in the marketplace without
experiencing affronts against the right of religious persons to
have their sincere beliefs respected by our government.161 In the
space remaining, I would like to offer three predictions for
what may lie ahead.
First, conflicts like the one in Masterpiece Cakeshop will
become more frequent and harder for our society to negotiate.
The “equality as sameness” principle has expanded to cover
sexual identity and behavior in a way few foresaw even a
decade ago.162 The principle continues to expand, driven by its
own inner logic. As Adrian Vermeule observes, the “triumph
of same-sex marriage” has been “followed . . . rapidly by the
opening of a new regulatory and juridical frontier, the
recognition of transgender identity.”163 Indeed, shortly after
Jack Phillips won his case at the Supreme Court, the Colorado
Civil Rights Division found probable cause that he had again
violated CADA, this time by refusing to create a cake for a
customer who wished to celebrate the anniversary of her
coming out as transgender.164 Phillips then filed an action for an
injunction against the Colorado authorities, again alleging a
violation of his constitutional rights.165 The state ultimately
decided not to pursue the case against Phillips as part of a
161. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
162. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 13, at 173–74 (discussing the rapid change in
public acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage).
163. Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism
[https://perma.cc/WT2N-B2A9].
164. See Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo.
Civil Rights Div. June 28, 2018) (probable cause determination),
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceCakeshopProbableCauseDetermination.
pdf [https://perma.cc/GX3C-X5XG].
165. See Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 2018), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceCakeshopComplaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WL5Q-EV3S].
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settlement agreement.166 But it seems likely that the courts will
soon need to decide whether vendors have a free exercise right
to decline to provide services for transgender coming out
ceremonies.
The new understanding of sexual identity and behavior has
become a flash point in our culture wars. Nones, especially
younger Nones, embrace the new understanding,167 as do
regulatory agencies, which seek to promote it in American
life.168 But the Traditionally Religious, who remain
comparatively numerous, continue to oppose it. Some of them,
at least, will continue to resist government efforts to enforce it.
That each side in the conflict cares deeply about the outcome,
and finds the other’s position increasingly unfamiliar and
offensive, will make compromise much more difficult.169
It is true that the Traditionally Religious may themselves
come to accept the new understanding over time. According to
the Pew survey I quoted earlier, acceptance of homosexuality
does appear to be “growing rapidly even among religious
groups” that traditionally have “strongly opposed” same-sex
relations.170 If the Traditionally Religious were to accept the
new understanding of sexuality, conflicts like Masterpiece
Cakeshop would fade from view, much as conflicts over serving
African-Americans in public places thankfully have
disappeared from American life. But it seems more likely that
those Traditionally Religious who accept the new
understanding will gradually drift away from religion entirely
and join the Nones. The mainline Protestant denominations
that have embraced new norms about homosexuality—for
example, the Episcopalians and Presbyterians171—have
166. See supra note 56.
167. On Nones’ acceptance of homosexuality, see supra Part II.A.
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. See INAZU, supra note 99, at 2–3 (discussing growing polarization over
values in American life). For an interesting discussion of how mutually
incompatible values make the resolution of social conflict between secular and
traditionally religious groups difficult, see JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS
MIND 105–10 (2012).
170. See AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 60, at 34.
171. The Episcopal Church reported a 19% decline in active members over the
ten-year period from 2007 to 2017. Episcopal Domestic Fast Facts: 2017, GEN.
CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, https://extranet.generalconvention.org/
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continued to experience sharp declines in membership, even as
membership in conservative churches has remained relatively
stable.172 Endorsing the new sexual norms has not kept
believers in the pews. Religious polarization, in other words,
seems likely to continue.
Second, the law in this area likely will remain unsettled and
deeply contested for some time to come, for two reasons. First,
as I explained earlier, the law of religious exemptions is already
something of a “patchwork.”173 Different jurisdictions apply
different tests in different circumstances. For example, for
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith indicates that no constitutional
right to a religious exemption exists where a law is neutral and
generally applicable.174 In circumstances where the state has
not shown neutrality towards religion, however, or where a
law is not generally applicable, a different rule applies under a
later case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.175
Before Masterpiece Cakeshop, most commentators understood
that Lukumi called for the compelling interest test in those
circumstances: the government could substantially burden
religious exercise if it had a compelling reason for doing so and
had chosen the least restrictive means.176 Justice Kennedy’s
staff/files/download/22938 [https://perma.cc/VQ9B-3LY4] (last visited Mar. 9,
2019). The Presbyterian Church (USA) lost almost 5% of its membership in 2017
alone. See 2017 Comparative Summaries, OFFICE OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY,
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA), http://oga.pcusa.org/site_media/media/uploads/
oga/pdf/statistics/2017_comparative_summaries.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TD9SRGW] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (listing a decline of 68,000 members out of 1.48
million in 2016). Since 2005, it has lost two out of every five active members.
Compare id. (listing 1.42 million active members in 2017), with 2008 Comparative
Summaries, OFFICE OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA),
https://www.pcusa.org/site_media/media/uploads/oga/pdf/2008-comp-sum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ENW4-8B63] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (listing 2.31 million
active members in 2005).
172. MARK CHAVES, AMERICAN RELIGION 87 (2011). For an interesting
discussion of how doctrinal leniency generally can lead to a decline in religious
commitment, see Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for
Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1341, 1355–58 (2016).
173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
174. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
175. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
176. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 51, at 375 (“The Smith/Lukumi rule evaluates
facially discriminatory laws under a compelling interest test.”).
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opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests, though, even without
going through the compelling interest analysis, that the
government’s failure to act neutrally amounts to a per se
violation.177 It remains to be seen what the Court will make of
this suggestion in future cases.
Federal constitutional doctrine is thus unsettled. With
respect to federal statutory law, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) requires the compelling interest test,178
although, as I will explain in a moment, saying that does not
clarify things too much. With respect to state constitutional and
statutory law, substantial variation exists.179 Some states apply
the Smith test as a matter of state constitutional law, while
others apply some version of the compelling interest test.180
Some states have adopted a version of RFRA and apply the
compelling interest test as a matter of state statutory law; some
do not.181 In short, generalizations are difficult.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the doctrinal uncertainty, the
compelling interest test remains the leading test in this area—
under Lukumi, under RFRA and its state analogues, or under
state constitutional provisions—and will provide the rule of
decision in most cases in which a vendor seeks a religious
exemption from anti-discrimination laws. 182 But—and this is
the second reason for my prediction that the law will remain
unsettled—the compelling interest test itself is deeply
indeterminate. It turns on vague concepts that provide little
guidance in specific cases.183 The test depends almost entirely
on the intuitions of individual judges, which of course differ
177. See supra pp. 720–21.
178. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(b), 107
Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)).
179. See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 189–90.
180. See id. at 198; see also DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 18, at 231 (identifying
the state high courts that have adopted some form of the Smith analysis for state
constitutional purposes).
181. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 189–90.
182. See id. at 198 (noting that “more than half of the states currently apply the
compelling interest test to free exercise claims”); DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note
18, at 231 (observing that “it seems likely that a majority of jurisdictions will
ultimately maintain strict scrutiny protections”).
183. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 21–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc) (discussing indeterminacy of the compelling interest standard).

746

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 42

greatly.184 In the recent Hobby Lobby case, for example, in which
plaintiffs sought a religious exemption under RFRA from the
so-called “contraceptive mandate,” the Justices differed
strongly among themselves on the meaning and application
both of “substantial burden” and “least restrictive means.”185
Indeed, in a society as polarized as ours, how could judges’
views on these concepts not differ? Is requiring a Christian
vendor to provide services on an equal basis for gay and
straight weddings a substantial burden on the vendor’s
religion? Does the state have a compelling interest in ending
discrimination that would justify that burden, even if other
nearby vendors would readily provide those services? Does the
state have reasonable alternative measures available to it that
would burden the vendor’s religious exercise to a lesser
degree? The answers depend on one’s perception of the nature
and value of religion, the true meaning of equality, the proper
scope of government action, and many other factors. The
questions do not submit to easy, objective criteria on which
everyone agrees, certainly not in our society, today. In a society
in which we cannot agree on what is good, how can we agree
on what is a compelling interest?
It is possible, of course, that these indeterminacy problems
will hasten the end of the compelling interest test. The test has
drawn strong criticism from judges and scholars for decades,
as far back as the Court’s 1990 Smith decision, which sought to
do away with the test, or at least to sharply confine it.186 Justices
Gorsuch and Alito hinted at their disapproval of Smith in
Masterpiece Cakeshop itself.187 But the test has shown remarkable
durability. As I have explained, the Court reaffirmed the test, at
least in some circumstances, only a few terms after Smith, in
184. See supra pp. 715–16.
185. Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726–31 (2014)
(arguing that the expense of the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial
burden and that it would be less restrictive for the Government to assume the cost
of coverage itself or shift the costs of covering contraceptives to insurers than to
mandate employers directly fund contraceptive coverage), with id. at 760–68
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (arguing that the contraceptive mandate was too
tenuously connected to religious beliefs to constitute a substantial burden and
that no alternative would effectuate the compelling interests at hand).
186. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–86 (1990).
187. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 162.
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Lukumi.188 Moreover, in 1993, Congress reinstated the test in
RFRA, by a unanimous vote in the House and a vote of 97–3 in
the Senate.189 It is not clear that RFRA would pass today—but it
is not clear that a vote to repeal it would succeed, either.190 Two
years ago, in the run-up to the Court’s decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Democratic members of Congress introduced the “Do
No Harm Act,” which sought to amend RFRA to make clear
that it would not apply to federal anti-discrimination laws.191
The Do No Harm Act would not have repealed RFRA, only
limited its application.192 And yet the new act did not attract a
single Republican cosponsor, in either the House or the
Senate.193 Repealing, or even amending, RFRA would require a
bipartisan coalition, and it is difficult to see how a coalition
could form in our current political environment.
American politics is becoming more and more polarized on
the basis of religion—something that has not been true,
historically.194 Religion is now a strong element of partisan
identity.195 Today’s Democratic and Republican Parties have
dramatically different religious profiles. According to a Pew
survey conducted in 2018, about 70% of Republicans and
people who lean Republican believe in the God of the Bible—
they are the Traditionally Religious.196 By contrast, only 45% of

188. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
189. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court’s Constitution, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 541
(2010).
190. See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil
Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 501 (2015)
(“It is, as many have observed, extremely unlikely that the RFRA would be
enacted today, let alone enacted with near-unanimous and bipartisan
support . . . .”).
191. Do No Harm Act, H.R. 3222, 115th Cong. (2017). The Senate version of the
bill, which bore the same name, was S. 2918, 115th Cong. (2018).
192. See H.R. 3222 § 3.
193. See id. at 1 (listing House co-sponsors); S. 2918 at 1 (listing Senate cosponsors).
194. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the
Purposes of Anti-Discrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 656–58 (2015).
195. See Mark Movsesian, The New Divide in American Politics, FIRST THINGS
(May 23, 2018), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2018/05/the-newdivide-in-american-politics [https://perma.cc/Q8PP-HFE6].
196. PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHEN AMERICANS SAY THEY BELIEVE IN GOD, WHAT
DO
THEY
MEAN?
22
(2018),
http://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/
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Democrats and Democratic-leaners say they believe in the God
of the Bible.197 Another Pew survey revealed that Nones now
make up the largest “religious” grouping in the Democratic
Party—about 30 percent.198 To be sure, some progressives are
religious believers, a group some have called the “Religious
Left.”199 But this group has relatively little impact within the
contemporary Democratic Party, and it’s not clear how much
impact the group will have in the future.200
In this political environment, a move by one party to tinker
with RFRA would immediately raise suspicions on the part of
the other. Achieving agreement on any changes seems unlikely.
As a result, the compelling interest test seems here to stay. And
that observation leads to my third and final prediction.
Masterpiece Caksehop suggests that judicial appointments,
certainly on the federal level, will become even more heated
and partisan than they already are. Because the compelling
interest test is so indeterminate, so dependent on the prior
commitments of the people doing the judging, the identity of
the judges is extremely important. Each side in our polarized
society understands how crucial it is to have judges with the
“right” intuitions about religion and equality on the bench.
Each, therefore, will fight long and hard to ensure that such
judges are appointed—and, conversely, that judges with the
“wrong” intuitions are not. Having judges with the “wrong”
intuitions about religion and equality could lead to negative
outcomes in cases about which both sides care deeply. The
stakes are too high to be ignored.
The late Justice Scalia recognized this dynamic long ago, in a
different context, in his dissent in Planned Parenthood of
uploads/sites/7/2018/04/Beliefs-about-God-FOR-WEB-FULL-REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8V4F-AUNB].
197. Id.
198. See AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 60, at 9.
199. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS (2009).
200. For explanations why the religious left will have difficulty influencing
progressive politics, see, e.g., Daniel Cox, Don’t Bet on the Emergence of a “Religious
Left,” FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 20, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/dontbet-on-the-emergence-of-a-religious-left/ [https://perma.cc/YSM6-PQE5]; Massimo
Faggioli, Francis & the “Religious Left”: It Won’t Be an Easy Match, COMMONWEAL
(July 30, 2018), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/francis-religious-left
[https://perma.cc/2D7R-53TH].
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.201 Because the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence had come to turn on the personal
values of the Justices, he observed, the electorate had every
right to focus on nominees’ values during the selection process.
“[C]onfirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate
into question-and-answer sessions in which Senators go
through a list of their constituents’ most favored and most
disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the
nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them,” he
wrote.202 “Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not
dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidently [sic]
committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a
sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put
forward.”203 For Justice Scalia, interrogating nominees about
their personal value judgments was a matter for regret. But,
good or bad, the compelling interest test, which makes judges’
value judgments about religion and equality crucial to the
outcome of a case, creates strong incentives to do so.
In short, the new religious partisanship will only amplify the
already intense acrimony over judicial selection. Given their
religious profiles, the two parties will likely nominate judges
with very different views on the conflict between antidiscrimination laws and religious liberty; each party will be
very wary of the other’s nominees. On the whole, given the
party’s religious makeup, one would expect Democrats to
nominate judges with skeptical views of traditional religion—
and therefore, less favorable views on exemptions for the
Traditionally Religious from anti-discrimination laws. One
would expect the opposite, on the whole, from judges
Republican administrations nominate. Again, because
everyone knows how high the stakes are, the judicial
confirmation wars will likely be quite passionate and divisive
for the foreseeable future.

201. 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1001.
203. Id.
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***
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision. The case turns on
rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between
our anti-discrimination laws, on the one hand, and our
commitment to religious freedom, on the other. But the
narrowness of the case’s holding is deceptive. In fact,
Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects very broad cultural and political
trends that drive those conflicts and shape their resolution: a
deepening religious polarization between Nones and the
Traditionally Religious, an expansive understanding of
equality as sameness, and an activist state dedicated to
enforcing that understanding in large areas of our common life.
As everyone knows, law and culture have a mutually
reinforcing relationship.204 Court rulings influence the way our
culture perceives social conflicts: which arguments seem
legitimate and which parties deserve our sympathies. But
culture, in turn, influences law. I have explored here the
cultural and political trends that form the backdrop to our
law’s attempt to resolve our competing commitments to
equality and to religious freedom. Those trends, which
Masterpiece Cakeshop so clearly reflects, will continue to shape
our law for decades to come.

204. See, e.g., Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 37 (2001)
(describing the “mutually constitutive nature of the relationship”). For a good
introductory essay on the subject of law and culture, see Menachem Mautner,
Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839 (2011).

